Abstract
In this paper I argue that the existence of an essentially necessary being is impossible because the concept is incoherent. By essentially necessary being, I mean a simple entity whose essence is identical to its existence and exists in every possible world. Traditionally, theologians have wished to say that God has this kind of necessity. Kant (1781) and Russell (1900) denied that existence was a property and for this reason they denied the coherence of an essentially necessary being. Swinburne (2012) claims that God has existed from eternity and is indestructible, but does not exist in every possible world. Craig (2016), Feser (2017), Pruss and Rasmussen (2018) defend the coherence of such a being, but Feser denies the efficacy of ontological arguments.
I. Introduction
Although it may be tempting to believe that it is possible for an essentially necessary being (henceforth, N) to exist, because the concept of is coherent, instead, in this paper, I will argue that it is possible for N to exist because it is conceivable that N does not exist and to deny its existence is not self-contradictory. I begin by giving background on relevant concepts, then I present an argument for my view, then I explain the premises and address four objections before a final conclusion.
II. Necessary Existence
Plantinga (1976, p. 105) treats existence as a property rather than a quantifier and says that “every object has the property of existence essentially,” but “only some things,” have necessary existence—“perhaps God.” Some propositions are self-contradictory and hence could not be true in any possible world, but other propositions are true by definition and hence are true in every possible world. (Ibid., p. 108) Non-existence is a property that nothing has because “there are no non-existent objects.” (Ibid., p. 105) Logically speaking, an entity must have the property of existence before it can have any further properties. I will consider three types of necessary existence:
[A] Firstly, traditional sort of necessity which God is supposed to have. An entity whose essence is to exist. For every other entity, their essence and identity are distinct. For this reason, God must exist and cannot fail to exist. [B] Secondly, what Plantinga (1976, p. 105-6) calls ‘necessary existence’ is a kind of modal status, the property of existing in every possible world, and it need not require that the entity’s essence is identical to its existence. An entity might have this kind of necessity without any further explanation for why it does besides its own ‘maximal greatness.’ (Plantinga 1974, p. 209-211) [C] Thirdly, the sort of necessity that analytic propositions, and mathematical theorems have. They are true in every possible world because they are true by definition and hence are self-contradictory to deny. (Plantinga 1976, p. 108.)
In my estimation, the type of necessity denoted by [C] is meaningful enough, because there is an intelligible reason for it. When one understands a sentence expressing an analytic proposition (e.g. ‘there are no married bachelors’), she can see that the proposition must be true, and it is inconceivable that it is false. For these reasons, she can validly conclude that the entity in question is necessary. However, N would be an entity that has the kind of necessity denoted by [A] or [B] and this kind of necessity is incoherent or impossible because the concept is not realizable.
III. An Argument
The argument then, is this:
If N existed, then its nonexistence would be inconceivable and a sentence denying the existence of N would be self-contradictory.
The nonexistence of N is conceivable.
A sentence denying the existence of N is not self-contradictory.
Hence, N does not exist.
Premise 1. This first part of this premise assumes the conceivability thesis, that if a state of affairs, S, is conceivable, then it is logically possible because it is not possible to conceive of a self-contradictory S. Something is logically possible if it does not entail any contradiction. (Ney 2014, p. 191.) This thesis requires, however, that one understands what S is under consideration. If the reasoner does not have a sufficient comprehension of the S in question, then the thesis is not of use, even if some S is self contradictory it may be apparently conceivable until some further facts are learned that reveal the contradiction. Hume (2007, p. 64.) defends something like the first part of this premise in his ‘Empty Worlds’ argument, “there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction.” Which is to say that the concept of necessity is not meaningfully applied to things other than propositions, sets, or theorems which are definitionally true.
By a sentence I mean some set of words or symbols arranged in a meaningful pattern but by a proposition I refer to the meaning expressed by that sentence. N’s existence is either impossible or necessary. If some S is logically possible, then there is some possible world where that S obtains. The only things which do not obtain in any possible world (henceforth W) are things which are self-contradictory. Hence, if there is an N, there could not possibly be any S incompatible with its existence. Therefore, N either exists in every W, or in none of them and any sentence which denies the existence of an N must express a self-contradictory proposition—or there is no such thing as N.
Premise 2. There are many conceivable W in which a N does not exist, e.g. if the ‘photon world’ is coherent, it is one such world. Many philosophers think that the actual world does not have a N in it.
Premise 3. It is not possible that any sentence which merely affirms or denies the existence of some entity could be self-contradictory, e.g. to say “there is no God,” “there are no fairies,” and “there is no reigning Tzar of Russia” could not be self-contradictory statements.
IV. Addressing Objections
Objection 1. An objection to Premise 1 is that the conceivability thesis is false because conceivability is not a guide for possibility.
In rebuttal, I would say that the thesis is at least true when one understands sufficiently the state-of-affairs (henceforth S) in question. Tidman (1994, p. 298.) defines the conceivability thesis this way: “If S is conceivable, then S is possible.” It is possible to verify that the conceivable thesis is true by considering a modest version of the inconceivability thesis which claims: If S is self-contradictory, then S is inconceivable. (Tidman, 1994, p. 297) If this modest version of the inconceivability thesis is true, then a modest version of its converse is true, namely, if S is not self-contradictory, then S is conceivable.
Various examples can prove this to be the case. It is not possible to mentally picture a square without any edges because this S is self-contradictory but it first requires knowing the basic definition of a square. If someone did not know that a square has four edges, then they may think it possible for there to be a square without any edges. Such examples show that if someone first comprehends the sentence that describes the S in question then the conceivability thesis is of use. This principle is also applicable to mathematical theorems. In the case of newly discovered theorems, it was conceivable that they might be false until they were understood and demonstrated to be true definitionally. Once mathematicians understand some theorem, then they see that it is necessarily true and it is inconceivable that it is false.
Objection 2. The non-existence of N is apparently conceivable but it is not ideally conceivable because it is not possible to comprehend the essence of N. If a philosopher fully comprehended the nature of N then she would see that N must exist. This is traditionally what theologians have taught concerning the necessary reality, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite says that N is ineffable, “Never, then, is it true to say, that we know God; not from His own nature (for that is unknown, and surpasses all reason and mind), but, from the ordering of all existing things.” (Parker 1897, p. 91.) John of Damascus, “it is clear that God exists, but what He is in essence and nature is unknown and beyond all understanding.” (Chase 1958, p. 170.) Gregory Palamas claimed “this essence transcends all affirmation and all negation." (Meyendorff 1983, p. 97.)
In rebuttal, I say that if someone makes the claim that N exists or does not exist, this claim is only meaningful if the variable can be defined and understood. The very theologians who teach divine ineffability, go on to write lengthy treatises making all sorts of claims about the nature of N. Defenders of ontological arguments who expect their audience to assess the truth of their arguments thereby assume that the concept of N is comprehensible enough to be analyzed in this manner. Therefore, it is possible to understand enough about the essence of N to assess whether it exists and whether its nonexistence is ideally conceivable, otherwise it would make no sense to do theology proper, or to philosophize about these issues at all and we are left with agnosticism about the question of whether N exists.
Objection 3. A further objection to premise 2 would be to claim that there is a hidden contradiction in supposing that N does not exist. Though theologians have been unable to spell out this contradiction for the past few thousand years, it may still lay undiscovered.
In rebuttal, I say that sometimes it is not possible to comprehend some S, and in such cases it is not possible to know whether it is truly conceivable or not. Some problems are too complex for human minds to comprehend. It is not possible for any human being to have an exhaustive knowledge of every entailment of all propositions. Due to our lack of omniscience, it is almost always possible there is some hidden contradiction in a particular proposition when one applies the conceivability thesis but as Swinburne (1993) comments:
“Of course, there just might be contradictions buried in the statements which we have been considering, but in the absence of argument to the contrary, we ought to assume what clearly appears to be the case that there are no such buried contradictions… Atheism is a coherent supposition.” (1993, p. 275)
To claim ‘N does not exist’ is asserting there is nothing which fits the description of such a being. It does not seem that a statement of this sort could ever be self-contradictory. Perhaps it is the case that “a negative existential sentence cannot entail a contradiction.” (Swinburne 2012, p. 1, 13-14)
Objection 4. An objection to premise 3 would be to claim that the atomic sentence ~ N is self-contradictory, it expresses that “the being which must exist does not exist.”
In rebuttal, I say the intended meaning of the proposition ~ N is not ““the being which must exist does not exist.” It is rather that “there is no such being as ‘the being which must exist and does not exist.’” It is claiming that there could not be anything which fits the description of N or if one must use Plantinga’s terminology, it is to say that it lacks the property of necessary existence, and so it does not have any further properties either. (1976, p. 105-16) These are both coherent and intelligible claims that do not involve contradictions.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that the traditional sort of necessity that theologians have wished to ascribe to God is impossible because of what it would imply. If there were an entity which had the kind of necessity denoted by [A] or [B] then its existence would be self-contradictory to deny, and its non-existence would be inconceivable. But negative existential statements of the sort ‘there is no such thing as N’ could never be self-contradictory. Further, it is conceivable that no such entity exists.
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