Regarding the Euthyphro Dilemma

0. Introduction

I shall discuss moral platonism somewhat and give general thoughts on the Euthyphro dilemma and how it relates to common theistic models. I will suggest it is best to ground moral objectivity in mind-independent abstracta rather than in God, otherwise divine actions are not obviously praiseworthy.

1. Universals

The problem of universals, is basically the problem of explaining the fact of similarity and commonality in the world. Universals are commonalities shared between classes of things. We perceive square objects and our daily experience and from this we infer a concept of squareness, likewise, we perceive red objects, and perceive a concept of redness. There is something common between objects that we are picking out with these adjectives. Multiple objects can instantiate or be red at the same time. We also perceive mathematical commonalities, and infer twoness, threeness, and so on. Plato explained these universals in terms of real abstract objects called forms or ideas. 

When we perceive instances of twoness in the physical world it is because physical states of affairs are in instantiating the abstract form of twoness. The forms are non-physical entities that exist in a realm beyond the physical world. But physical things can instantiate them. What “instantiating” the forms means is a difficult matter. In the Timaeus (48e4) it seems to mean that physical objects in some way reflect the forms, they “imitate” them, but in the Parmenides (131a4-e7) Plato surveys different possible accounts and describes the benefits and shortcomings of each. These universal forms are necessities and exist in every possible world, whether or not there are any physical things to instantiate them. 

Plato grounded absolute moral principles in the Forms rather than in any physical object or in any of the gods. (Republic 443c-462b) In the Timaeus he gives his theory of the creation of the world, he refers to the creator god as Father and as the demiurge, meaning maker or shaper.  The Demiurge in his great wisdom surveyed the forms and then formed primordial matter into the universe ensuring that its structure mirrored the Forms. (Timaeus 28a6) When some state of affairs corresponds to the form of the good, then it is a good thing and evil actions our state of affairs that do not correspond to the form of the good. The form of the good is superior to all of the other forms, and in contemplating the form of the good and intended to mirror it, one achieves virtue. (Republic 443e)

2. The Dilemma and the Forms

Naturally, many pious Greeks would have worried that Plato did not simply ground absolute ethics in the will of the gods. This objection is dealt with in the Euthyphro (10a-11b), the famous dilemma that goes that either goodness is grounded in the world of the gods, or it does not depend upon the gods. In this little dialogue, Euthyphro plays the part of a pious Grecian who believes the will of the gods is the absolute standard of ethics, and Socrates cross examines him. Socrates asks: 

“Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?” (10a)

It could not be that goodness is grounded in the will of the gods because that would make goodness arbitrary. Some gods might love some action x while other gods hate x, this would mean that x is both permissible and yet not permissible, a contradiction. (7e-8a) 

Further, if they did have unanimous accord, whatever the gods decided would be good, even if it was something obviously bad. If we were to ground goodness in the will of the gods, and the gods were to say that theft, rape, or murder are ethical, then these acts would therefore be ethical—but surely that is not right. There is a kind of necessity to ethics. Evil actions remain evil regardless of anyone’s opinion about those actions. Murder would still be wrong even if the gods voted and decided that it was fine. To ground ethics in the will of the gods would render them arbitrary stipulations. Therefore, Plato concludes that ethical principles are real, and they exist independently of the gods, “that which is holy loved by the gods, because it is holy,” inherently, and necessarily so. 

Motivated by strict monotheism, many of the medieval theologians sought to ground ethics in the nature or will of God himself. Due to their devotion to the doctrine of divine simplicity, medieval theologians believed that God was identical to his nature, which is either a trope or a universal, and that God’s will was constrained by his nature. In fact, strictly speaking, God’s will is identical to his nature as his will. Or as the fourth Lateran council (1215 CE) declared, “all that is in God, is God.”

This leads to two further problems, firstly, it reduces praises of God’s goodness to tautologies, or statements of mere definition. If God’s nature just is the good, when someone says, “God is good” they are uttering a tautology. “God is good” and “good is God,” are convertible propositions, no different in their basic sense from saying “God is God” or “good is good.” God is what he is. 

Secondly, in the Timaeus, God is more intelligibly praiseworthy for his ethical actions, God does things in accord with the good, which is an external set of necessities, and he acts in time in response to situations. This is sharply different from the timeless and static ultimate Good of the medievals. 

God cannot decree that actions like rape are permissible. This is explained either in the necessity of moral principles themselves, or some feature about God. This requires distinguishing between different sorts of necessities. If some fact x is necessary, it needs no further explanation. Why does God exist? He is necessary. Why is harming innocents wrong? It is necessary. To make the claim that one necessity has a dependency relationship with another, requires some further justification. It is simpler to say that some moral principles are just necessities, and that is all. To posit a dependency relation with a deity is unnecessary. 

Further, the God of the medieval theologians would exist by necessity, and this would entail that moral principles could not possibly have any other ground besides their model of God. Hence, if there is at least one coherent moral theory in which there are moral facts, which are not directly grounded in divine decree or God’s essence, then it is not necessary to ground morals in God. 

Now, what the defender of medieval monotheistic theories could do is make an abductive argument that their model of God is the best explanation for moral facts. But saying it is the necessary model is to say that there are no other possible atheistic or theistic models, which is patently false.