Thursday, October 24, 2024

Arguments Against Necessary Beings

0. Introduction


Contingent beings might be defined as things which do not contain within themselves. The complete reason of their existence, which is to say that they are things which might not exist. In contrast, a necessary being would be one which contains with itself the reason of its existence. Something which must exist and cannot not-exist, i.e. a being whose non-existence is impossible. Which is to say, a metaphysically necessary being is one who exists with the strongest kind of necessity, in every possible world, one whose nonexistence is impossible, whose essence entails existence (or in Thomistic language, one whose essence just is existence). God has traditionally been defined as a necessary being. Contingency arguments seek to prove the existence of at least one necessary being from the fact that there are contingent beings. Since the time of Aristotle, this has been a popular method of arguing for the existence of God. I will summarize a few arguments against the existence of a necessary being.


1. Hume and Conceivability 


Hume presented an argument against the existence of a necessary being from the conceivability and inconceivability theses. Hume explained these theses in the following manner: 


“Tis an established maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.” — David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Oxford University Press, 1965, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), p. 32


The theses are commonly used in metaphysics even to this day and thereby remain “established” by their use. Much of our work in metaphysics would seem quite hopeless if conceivability is not a guide to metaphysical possibility and impossibility. The conceivability thesis states that if some state of affairs S is clearly conceivable, then it is not “absolutely impossible,” which is to say that it is metaphysically possible. We may clearly conceive of a gold mountain. The inconceivability thesis states that if some state of affairs S is inconceivable, then it is metaphysically impossible. As Hume states, we cannot conceive of a mountain without a valley, either in a mental picture or conceptually, because mountains by their very definition have valleys otherwise they would not be mountains. For a modern discussion of these theses see Paul Tidman’s Conceivability as a test for possibility (American Philosophical Quarterly 31. no. 4, 1994), p. 297-309.


Hume, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion makes an argument against the existence of God from these theses which he considered a conclusive refutation of traditional monotheism. The argument might be summarized this way: 


1. Anything we can conceive of as existing we can conceive of as not existing. (Premise)

2. We can conceive of God existing. (Premise)

3. Hence, we can conceive of God not existing. (From 1, 2)

4. Whatever we can conceive of not existing, does not necessarily exist. (Premise)

C. Therefore, God does not necessarily exist. (From 3, 4)


I think that Hume, quite correctly, regards arguments of this sort as clear refutations of the concept of a metaphysically necessary being: 


“I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable [in this way], unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it… The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.” (Ibid, Part 9 Section 5, 6.)


This kind of objection is not new, and has been levied by plenty of metaphysicians, I would not know who the first is. I recall Bertrand Russell said something like, ‘for Leibniz, every proposition seems to be analytical.’


2. Inwagen, the PSR and God


I have altered and edited Inwagen's argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) into an argument purporting to show an incompatibility between existence of a necessary being such as God and the PSR. 


1. No necessary proposition explains a contingent proposition. (Premise)

2. If the PSR is true, then all true contingent propositions have an explanation. (Premise)

3. If a proposition explains a conjunction it explains every conjunct. (Premise

4. Some proposition x only explains a proposition y if x is true. (Premise)

5. Suppose the PSR is true and God exists. (Assumed for reductio ad absurdum)

6. There is a Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF), that is the conjunction of all true contingent propositions. (Premise)

7. The BCCF has an explanation. (From 2 and 6)

8. If God exists, then God exists necessarily and explains the BCCF. (Premise)

9. God exists necessarily and explains the BCCF. (From 5 and 8)

10. If God exists necessarily and explains the BCCF, then the BCCF is necessary. (Premise)

11. The BCCF is necessary. (From 1, 9 and 10)

12. The explanation of the BCCF is contingent. (From 1 and 7)

13. If the explanation of the BCCF is contingent, then the BCCF is contingent. (Premise)

14. The BCCF is contingent. (From 12 and 13)

15. Thus, the explanation of the BCCF is necessary and contingent  (From 9 and 12) and the BCCF is necessary and contingent (From 11 and 14)—and that is contradictory. 

C. Hence, it is false that God exists and that the PSR is also true.


To illustrate P1, if some proposition x is necessary, then it is the case in every possible world, and if x explains some proposition y in some possible world, then it explains y in every possible world, hence x and y would both be necessary.


The BCCF is contingent by definition, as it is the conjunction of all contingent facts. It is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact. Typically, the move by the modern theologian here is to weaken the PSR, and deny premise 2, and along with it a host of contingency arguments. The other move is to embrace a sort of necessitarianism. For these and other possible solutions see Alexander R. Pruss’ The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment published in 2006 by Cambridge University Press, 2006. 


3. Swinburne’s Argument


Richard Swinburne is an Eastern Orthodox theologian who does not believe that God is metaphysically necessary. While he would say that God exists, he does not believe that God exists in every possible world. He presents an argument for this conclusion in his article What Kind of Necessary Being Could God Be? published in 2012 by the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):1:18. The basic idea is this, a necessary being is one whose nonexistence is impossible. Therefore the proposition God exists, would be an analytical proposition which is to say that it must be true and could not possibly be false. Conversely, the proposition God does not exist, would be necessarily false. We can only analyze the meanings of these propositions by studying the sentences that express them. But there is no contradiction in the sentence “God does not exist” or any equivalent sentence. Which is to say there could not possibly be a necessary being of that sort. There might exist a God with a weaker kind of necessity, but there could not be a God, which is metaphysically necessary in the traditional sense of that term.

Saturday, October 19, 2024

Some Thoughts on Personal Identity


It has often been a primary argument of some substance dualists that mere bodily identity is insufficient to ground our unified personal experience over time. Our identity must therefore, they argue, be grounded in something more. Eliminativists like the great Daniel Dennett argued that our apprehension of a unified Self enduring through time is illusory. The substance dualist theory is that humans are composed of essentially two parts, a physical body and a non-physical soul. Personal identity is grounded primarily in a soul, in the strictly literal sense, the Cartesian dualist says that humans are souls, not merely that they have souls. 


“I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing.” (Descartes, Discourse on Method, IV.)


Descartes regarded the soul as his only essential part, so he says that his existence requires “no place” and is not “dependent on any material thing.” In sharp contrast, monist theories must ground identity within the material realm, to regard personal identity as a kind of bodily identity. This is most strongly represented in the identity theory, where the mind just is identical with the brain, and mental states are identified with particular neuro-physical states. Smart famously expressed disbelief that the entire world could be explained in physical and material terms with the exception of conscious states. 


“So sensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe that this can be so. That everything should be explicable in terms of physics (together of course with descriptions of the ways in which the parts are put together-roughly, biology is to physics as radio-engineering is to electromagnetism) except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.” (J. J. C. Smart, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 Apr., 1959, p. 142.)


If humans are identical with their bodies upon monist theories and identical with their souls upon the substance dualist theories, one can make arguments from personal identity to favor one theory over the other. Consider the following kind of argument. 


1. re ∧ ~b

2. (i ∧ ~b) ⊃ ~e

3. e

4. ∴ ~(i ∧ ~b)

5. i 🇻 ~b

6. ~b

7. ∴ ~i

8. (e ∧ ~b ∧ ~i r) ⊃ s

9. e ∧ ~b ∧ ~i r

C. ∴

r = ‘I now exist’ 

e = ‘I existed in 2010’ 

b = ‘This body existed in 2010’ 

i = ‘I am identical with this body’ 

s = ‘I am identical with a non-bodily mental thing, or soul’ 


It seems every presently existing adult should concede re ∧ ~b, that our present bodies did not exist in 2010, our bodies are constantly undergoing gradual replacement. Billions of cells die and are placed constantly, parts of our bodies are gradually replaced with the matter from food and drink we consume. The present set of atoms that compose this body were not in this form in 2010 and our bodies are constantly undergoing change. Yes, it seems that ~b is a quite well supported claim. But our identity and conscious experience remains unified and persistent across time, regardless of these radical changes with our body. Our existence is constituted in our conscious existence across time. 

The most controversial premise seems to be the second premise. To avoid the force of the argument, it seems to me, the best approach would be to try and deny the entailment specified. The physicalist may claim that when he says he is identical with his body, he does not mean any particular body at a point in time, but rather that he is identical with the general form of the body in question. The body in 2010 and his present body share many resemblances, they have similar parts, memories, and ways of living.  I would say that this kind of claim seems insufficient. There seems to be an enduring subject of phenomenally conscious experiences which is more than the mere form of the body in question.

It is possible to construct two complete individuals out of the physical bits of matter that constitute my body. Substituting the necessary parts so that the two resultant individuals each have 50% of the matter of the original person. But they would not both be me because they have different phenomenally conscious experiences (i.e. if you poked one with a needle the other would not feel it.) Even if they both resembled me very well and had similar memories and beliefs, and ways of living they would not make them both me in this sense.

One might claim that they are both me, but this seems false because the only kind of identity that matters here is the kind of identity that Descartes mentioned, “thinking,” or conscious experiencing. If you poked the body that existed in 2010 with a needle, a particular subject would feel pain, if you poked any body which presently exists with a needle would the same subject feel pain? Or does some does the new consciousness subject inhabit the body after a sufficient amount of matter has been replaced? Hence, the entailment in premise 2 seems well founded to me on the basis of such considerations. If I were identical with the body in 2010, (which no longer exists due to gradual replacement of parts,) then I, who presently exist, did not exist in 2010. Composition is not always identity, but that depends upon the kind of identity claims being made (as with the Ship of Theseus). 

When considering the third premise, and assessing whether or not e is true, it is necessary to make clear that the claim is whether or not the same conscious individual that now exists also existed in 2010. The claim of e is not necessarily a claim about the body, or about something other than the body, it is a claim about whether or not the same consciousness that now persists one existed in 2010 as well. To my mind, the rest of the argument seems to follow with clarity from accepting the first three premises, though premise 8 may require some Cartesian assumptions.



Evidence and God


It is sometimes argued that God is an unnecessary explanatory hypothesis. To postulate the existence of God is to claim that there is a necessary, omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being which is the explanation for the existence of the universe, and the most general features of our experience. But it seems that the normal methods of scientific investigation will be able to tell us everything one could ever want to know about the cosmos. In ancient times, it was common to posit gods, ghosts and demons to explain lightning, disease, and changing seasons. The Egyptians postulated Ra's journey across the sky to the underworld to explain night and day—but now that humans have demonstrable scientific and natural explanations there is no good reason to believe that Ra is responsible for darkening of the sky every afternoon. (Book of the Dead, 17a3 [Allen]) The seer Amos said that his God, "creates the wind, reveals thoughts to mankind, turns dawn to darkness, and treads on the heights of the earth." (Amos 4:13) But humans are able to peer past the clouds into the stars, and God does not tread there. Dawn turns to darkness because of the orbit of the earth around the sun, and the wind is caused by the rotation of the earth. Amos did not know any of these scientific explanations for the world he experienced. Inwagen (2005) calls this the “Superfluidity Argument” and summarizes it as follows: 


“The only reason we could have for believing in God would be that it was necessary to postulate his existence to account for some observed fact or facts. But science can explain everything we observe, and its explanations do not appeal to God or to any other supernatural agency. Hence, there is no reason to believe that God exists. That is to say, the existence of God is an unnecessary hypothesis.” 


God should not be postulated as the explanation for some specific physical phenomenon, such as lightning or rain. These kinds of specific phenomena are accessible to scientific investigation and testing. In such cases, it would be perfectly valid to say, 


‘In due time we will have a scientific explanation of such and such phenomena.’ 


But it would be very out of place to say,


‘Since we have no scientific explanation, a divine miracle must be the explanation, God did it!’ 


Therefore, the kind of thing which would be evidence for God against naturalism would have to be something that is beyond the scope of scientific or abductive means of explanation. It would also have to be something which is expected on the hypothesis that there is a God, but would not be expected if naturalism were true. The general theistic arguments appeal to the following phenomena as data which raises the probability of theism or necessitates the existence of a maximally great being (MGB). 


i. The existence of a complex physical universe. 

ii. The conformity of the universe to regular physical laws. 

iii. The life-permitting nature of these laws. 

iv. The existence of humanlike creatures. 

v. That humans have souls with mental states connected to brains. 

vi. That humans have moral awareness. 

vii. That humans have free will and can make significant choices. 

viii. The testimony of many witnesses to religious experiences and miracles.

ix. The apparent design in nature. 


The general atheistic arguments appeal to the following data as lowering the probability of theism, or as being incompatible with the existence of an MGB.

i. The prevalence of suffering and evil in the world amond human beings. 

ii. The apparent meaninglessness and gratuitousness of most suffering.

iii. The hiddenness of God, his lack of perceptible interaction with the world. 

iv. The absence of verifiable public miracles.  

v. The widespread religious confusion and conflict in the world.

vi. The existence of non-resistant unbelievers, i.e. those who are open to a relationship with God and yet God does not reveal himself to them. 

vii. The prevalence of suffering of animals. 

viii. The contradictory nature of religious experiences and miracles.

ix. The errancy of popular holy books.


There is an inherent simplicity which favors naturalism over theism. The naturalist believes the only world that exists is the one which we readily and directly experience, the world of matter and energy which we see around us. This is a very simple model of reality. The theist, in contrast, posits another realm of existence, of spirits, angels, demons, and a transcendent God. One model is simpler than another if it posits fewer substances, fewer kinds of substances, with simpler properties (i.e. properties that can be expressed in mathematically simple ways). Therefore, a good theistic argument should appeal to some phenomenon which cannot be explained naturally and could plausibly be explained by positing a personal explanation beyond the natural world.


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