Resurrection is Incompatible with Physicalism

The Resurrection and Physicalism

 0. Introduction

In this paper I shall explain why physicalism is incompatible with the doctrine of resurrection, which is to say that it is metaphysically impossible for both of them to be affirmed consistently.

1. Resurrection, Physicalism and Substance Dualism

Generally, Christians have always affirmed in the doctrine of Bodily Resurrection, which states, in part, that deceased persons will be made to live again in human bodies. (cf. Matt.16:26-27; John 5:28-29; Acts 24:15) Some Christians also profess belief in the doctrine of physicalism, which implies, in part, that human beings consist only of physical matter and do not possess immaterial souls which will survive the death of the body. The distinguishing feature of physicalist theories of mind is the doctrine of mind-body supervenience, the concept that it is impossible for any two things to differ in their mental properties if they are identical in their physical properties. (Kim, 2011, p. 9.)

Cartesian Dualism or Interactionism, is the view that human beings are composed of two parts, a physical body and a non-physical soul, and the soul is what makes us who we are, the soul is our essential part, it is a mental substance which is the subject of our first person qualitative experiences (or qualia).

“Cartesian substance dualism pictures the world as consisting of two independent domains, the mental and the material, each with its own distinctive defining properties... it is metaphysically possible for one domain to exist in the total absence of the other.” (Kim, 1996, p. 15)

On such a theory, our soul interacts with a particular brain therefore if the brain is damaged, the incarnate experience of the soul is affected. At death, these two parts, body and soul, are separated and the soul continues to exist. I shall argue that physicalist theories of mind are incompatible with the doctrine of Resurrection.

I shall define mental events as those events which are described in terms of mental properties. Mental properties are features of consciousness which include purposes, emotions, desires, and beliefs. Mental properties can be known directly by those who have them in a private way. In contrast, physical properties are publicly accessible features of physical substances. They are things such as size, shape, color, and mass. Physical properties are the objects of study in physical sciences such as chemistry, physics and geology. Mental properties are often the subject of study in fields such as psychology and psychotherapy.

2. Personal Identity

What makes you who you are? And what would make any subsequent body yours? If not even one part of someone survives the death of the body, it is very hard to see how any human body which is created thereafter could be the same person. 

If my body were destroyed by the explosion of a nuclear bomb, then God could create a new body which was identical to my former body. But that would not make the subsequent body mine. Any subsequent body, although physically similar to the original body, would be a mere copy, reproduction, duplicate or clone of the body that was destroyed.

Many Christians have been cremated, their bodies largely being converted into heat energy. In some cases corpses are consumed in whole or part by plants, which were in turn consumed by animals and humans. Which is to say that the matter which once constituted the body of some deceased person now constitutes the bodies of other living persons. 

If nothing survives the death of the body, then what remains to be resurrected? There is nothing. It would be impossible to resurrect any individual human if humans are purely physical beings. This reasoning may be summarized as follows:

1. The doctrine of resurrection necessitates that a person who was formerly dead is provided with a subsequent body that belongs specifically to them. (Premise)

2. To consider any particular body as belonging specifically to a person who was formerly dead, there must be a mental continuity between the person who was formerly dead and their subsequent body. (Premise)

3. Hence, the doctrine of resurrection necessitates a mental continuity between the person who was previously dead and their subsequent body. (From 1, 2)

4. If there is no part of a person which survives the death of their body, then it is impossible to maintain a mental continuity between a person who died and their subsequent body. (Premise)

5. Hence, the doctrine of the resurrection necessitates that there is a part of a person which survives the death of their body that secures mental continuity between the formerly deceased and their subsequent body. (From 3, 4) 

6. The only sort of thing that could secure a mental continuity between a formerly deceased person and a subsequent body is a mental substance or soul. (Premise)

7. Therefore, the doctrine of resurrection necessitates the existence of a mental substance or soul, which survives the death of the original body and secures a mental continuity between the formerly deceased person and their subsequent body. (From 1-6)

Premise 1. What does it mean to say that a human body belongs to a particular person? It could not merely mean that some of the matter which comprised the former body now comprises the resurrection body because several bodies might contain the matter which once comprised the body of someone now deceased. For some particular body to belong to a particular person, then the mental events associated with that body must be known by that person necessarily, which is to say they must be known directly.

For example, people may discover that I am angry by the words I say, by my actions or by my facial expressions and actions. These are all publicly accessible ways of knowing that I am angry, but I have a further way of knowing that I am angry, namely, by directly experiencing the anger in question. If I am angry, I know necessarily that I am angry because I am the one who is angry.

Even God could not know that I am angry in the same way that I know that I am angry. God does not know the proposition, “I, Anthony, am angry,” because God is not Anthony, and my being angry does not mean that God is also angry. I would know of my own anger in a way different from everyone else, including God, I would know of it by virtue of it being my anger, via direct experience. So, I know that I am angry necessarily, because I am the one who is angry. Other people do not know this necessarily, because they are not the ones experiencing the anger in question. Hence, for any physical body to belong to a specific person they must have private access to the mental events of that body in the way that I have described. Some particular body belongs to a particular person if the mental events associated with that body are known to them necessarily in the way that I have described. 

Premise 2. It will not suffice to say that there is only a physical continuity between some particular corpse and a resurrection body. For instance, if the material from which one corpse was formed might be used to create three new bodies, and those bodies after being brought to life would be three distinct individuals with separate mental experiences, even though their bodies were all formed from the same original corpse.

Another common illustration would be the instance of a cannibal who consumed another person. The atoms which once comprised the unfortunate individual would now become part of the cannibal’s body, therefore, in the resurrection, both individuals will have an equally valid claim to those particular atoms. Furthermore, the bodies of many saints who have once lived were cremated, or otherwise destroyed. The apostle Paul was beheaded, and although some of his bones may have been preserved much of his body is lost, Ignatius of Antioch was eaten alive by lions, Polycarp of Smyrna was burned to death, and countless saints have died in fires, bombings, or were cremated at death. In other words, their original bodies have been decayed or destroyed.

But in the resurrection, their subsequent bodies must belong specifically to them and not to any other person. Such examples show that it is insufficient to have merely a physical continuity between some corpse and a subsequent body, rather there must be a different sort of continuity, a mental continuity. When we say that some particular body is ours we are speaking primarily concerning the mental goings on of that body. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that personal identity over time makes little sense at all if physicalism is true and would be subject to the same paradoxes.

A physicalist might claim that, although the resurrection body will be made of different matter than the original body, it will be the same person because it will have an identical personality, memories, and qualities as the original person. But if I were to die, God might create two or two dozen bodies and give them identical personalities, characteristics, qualities, memories and habits. But which one would be me? They could not all be me. Each of these bodies would have different conscious lives, hence, it is not possible that any of them could be me, and nothing would make one of them more like myself than another. These would be nothing more than an assortment of doppelgangers. The only thing that could make any of some subsequent bodies belong to me is an enduring mental continuity. Merely having identical memories, or personality traits would not ensure such a thing. None of them would be me. What distinguishes such a “resurrection” from “duplication”? It does not matter if the resurrection body merely has the same personality and memory as I had at the time of death—I want it to be me. 

Premise 4. Suppose that I have a plastic chess set, and that all of the plastic which constitutes this chess set is destroyed. By destroying all of the matter which constituted the chess set, it would cease to exist entirely. No subsequent plastic chess set could be that same chess set which was destroyed. It is impossible to say that the chess set survived the destruction of all the plastic which constituted it, unless it had some non-plastic part which survived the destruction. (Everitt, 2000, p. 331-347.) Equivalently, if humans simply are their physical bodies, they would cease to exist when their physical body is destroyed unless there were some non-bodily part of the person which survived the death of their body. If there is nothing which survives death then there is nothing to maintain a mental continuity between the resurrection body and the person who was once deceased.  

Premise 6. Seeing that mental continuity is vital for resurrection, then there must be some part of a person which survives bodily death which preserves a continuity of consciousness and identity. This part which survives death could not be a physical substance, hence it is a non-physical substance, and since it has mental properties it is a mental substance, and this is what is typically meant by a soul in the Cartesian sense. The term "substance" is used here in the sense of an independently existing thing, the soul might exist independently of the body and vice versa, therefore they are two differing substances for the dualist.

3. Omnipotence and Resurrection

Because this is essentially a theological critique and it is supposed to be God who performs the resurrection, the most immediate objections to the argument must be from the doctrine of omnipotence. I will give a common and expansive definition of omnipotence:

Some agent x is omnipotent if x can perform any action which it does not entail a contradiction to perform.

Most theists would concede that God’s omnipotence is constrained at the very least by the law of non-contradiction, they do not suppose that God can commit suicide, or decide to cease being divine, etc. 

It entails a contradiction to suppose that an omnipotent being can resurrect a physicalist creature whose body has been utterly destroyed. Suppose that I build a house with my own hands and it burns to ashes in a great fire. And let us further suppose that after the fire, I see a structure, which looks identical to the house which burned down. In the distance I also see a trusted friend standing there by the house so I asked him what had happened. This trusted friend tells me,

“God himself has miraculously recreated the house that you built. In fact, the house that now stands here, is the very same house which burnt down and ceased to exist!”  

I would reply that this deed seems impossible, even for an omnipotent God. It is entirely possible that God can create a perfect replica of the original house, but it would not be that house, the same house I built with my own hands and which was burnt down. This rebuilt house did not exist at the same time as the original house. The earliest moment of its existence would be after the original house burnt down. It would never have known my hammer strokes, my paintbrush strokes, nor was it in the world at the same time as the original house. All of its parts occupy their positions because of God’s actions, not  because of my own. I did not build this house, God did. (cf. Van Inwagen, 1978, pp. 118.) My friend responds, 

“Ah, but this is that house, God has brought back the very same house which you built and which was burnt down. It is not a replica or a duplicate, it is the exact same house.”

 

But I admit freely that this seems incoherent to me. I would not know what to make of this claim even though I would wish to believe him. I do not see how it could possibly be true. If, somehow, then God could recreate the exact house that burnt down, surely he could also create two or three, or three hundred houses which were identical to the first. Yet none of them would be the original house. They would all be copies, duplicates, replacements of the original house. Even if God were to gather every atom of the original house and put them in the exact positions they were at before the fire, the various atoms would occupy their position as a result of God’s activity, not mine, it would be a reconstruction. Therefore, once my house has burned down, it is not possible that any future house could be that same house. At this point, my friend has grown tired of my logic-chopping, and he says:

“Ah, I see your objections, but it is that very same house, and it is a mystery how God was able to bring it back. God, by a process which surpasses human comprehension, has brought back your house, the very same one which was burned down.” 

It is valid sometimes to appeal to divine mystery, but not in cases such as these. God cannot perform contradictory actions. Theologians have typically defined omnipotence to mean that God can perform any action which does not entail a contradiction. There are plenty of actions which God cannot perform because they would entail contradictions. God cannot lie because he is essentially holy. God cannot commit suicide because he is immortal. God cannot create a sphere with edges. God cannot create a triangle with two sides. God cannot create a stick with only one end. God cannot make 2+2=7 and so on. All of these actions would entail contradictions. Equivalently, bringing back a house which has ceased to exist is a contradiction not a mystery. It is not a mystery what a house is, nor what destruction is, nor what duplication means. These are things that we know, they are not mysteries. Because we know the definitions of these words we can analyze the meanings of sentences which contain these words and see whether or not they entail contradictions. If the death of a man is at all analogous to the illustrations I have given, and if the arguments I have given are valid, then physicalism stands in contradiction to the concept of resurrection and appealing to mystery does not do away with contradictions. If a human being ceases to exist entirely, there is nothing left over to reconstruct  or resurrect. 

---

Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011).

Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind–Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

Nicholas Everitt, “Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence,” Faith and Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2000): 333–47, here 336.

Peter van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 2 (1978): 118. 

Conscious Afterlife and Christianity

In the Acts of the Apostles, when St. Stephen is being stoned to death, his final words are, “Lord Jesus, safeguard my spirit.” (Acts 7:59) He was not asking for Christ to guard a non-specific life force. He wished for his soul to be safeguarded in order to ensure his future Resurrection. If there is at least one genuine out of body experience, a single instance when an individual was transported to some place outside of their body, or if such a thing is even possible—then physicalism is false. The apostle Paul believed that he may have had such a genuine experience, that he might have been transported into heaven "out of the body." He professed to have been “caught up into the third heaven” but is unsure whether it occurred “in the body” or “outside of the body.” (2 Cor. 12:1-3) In this state he saw and heard heavenly things, he claims he was “caught up into Paradise and heard inexpressible words, which a man is not permitted to speak.” (2 Cor. 12:4) This is noteworthy because this means he had a conscious existence in heaven, whether in the body or outside of it. These statements of Paul are incompatible with the concept that humans simply are bodies. If it is even possible that he went to heaven “outside of the body,” then physicalism would be false. The only way to avoid such an implication would be to deny what the apostle plainly says and deny the inspiration of his writings. If physicalism were true, then genuine out of body experiences would be impossible because humans simply would be their bodies. By implying that genuine out of body experiences are possible St. Paul implies that physicalism is false. If physicalism were true it would make no sense to speak of a person as separated from their body. The statements made in 2 Cor. 12:1-3 are only possible if Paul believed that there was some part of human beings which could survive consciously apart from the physical body. Saint Paul looked forward to being “absent from the body and present with the Lord.” (2 Cor. 5:8) Being “in the body” means being absent from the Lord, and being out of the body means being with the Lord. (2 Cor. 5:6-8) The apostle has no concept that he will pass out of existence or be unconscious upon his death. Before the resurrection ever takes place, he will be with the Lord in heaven. This same concept is found in Phil. 1:21-23:

“For to me, to live is Christ and to die is gain. But if I am to live on in the flesh, this will mean fruitful labor for me; and I do not know which to choose. But I am hard-pressed from both directions, having the desire to depart and be with Christ, for that is very much better.” 

To die is gain because dying means he will “depart and be with Christ,” not that he will be nonexistent for thousands of years until he is recreated. Nor would he be with Christ in any meaningful sense if he were never aware of it. Although the New Testament teaches an afterlife, it does not teach the inherent immortality of the Soul. (Phaedo, 80b-d) Plato believed that every human soul existed from eternity and could not be destroyed. Plato defined destruction as being the decay, or breaking down of some particular thing into its constituent parts. In the Phaedo he argued that the Soul was absolutely simple and free of composition so it could not be broken into any lesser parts and was therefore essentially immortal and indestructible. (Phaedo 78a-84b) This argument is plainly fallacious and is not taken seriously by modern philosophers. It is possible for simple things to cease existing entirely and pass out of existence without leaving behind any parts. The New Testament speaks of immortality as a gift from God given to the righteous rather than an inherent property of every soul. (Rom. 2:6-7; 1 Cor. 15:53-55) Therefore, while the soul is more durable than the physical body, it would be inappropriate to regard it as essentially immortal or indestructible, the very saying, “fear him who can destroy both soul and body,” implies that God has the ability, if he so wishes, to annihilate a soul. (Matt. 10:28) 

Contrary to this, Plato would maintain that the Soul is eternal and essentially indestructible and not even the creator God or demiurge could destroy it, and regarded every soul which now exists as co-eternal with God, no new soul could be created nor could any be destroyed, for Plato, the number of souls in existence was absolutely fixed. Very few Christians today maintain the doctrine of the soul’s inherent immortality as it was taught by Plato. Hence, while the Bible does indeed teach the existence of souls it does not teach their inherent immortality in the platonic sense. There is a significant difference between the Biblical descriptions of souls and the platonic. 

Our earliest patristic authors all express belief in a conscious afterlife in heaven for the deceased who have not yet been resurrected. Clement of Rome was such an early author who is perhaps mentioned in the New Testament by Paul. (Phil. 4:3; Eusebius, Ecc. His. 3.4.10) In the fifth chapter of his epistle to the Corinthians, Clement speaks of the death of the apostles and says:

"There was Peter who by reason of unjust jealousy endured not one but many labors, and having endured his testimony went to his appointed place of glory." (1 Clem. 5:4) 

Speaking of the apostle Paul, he says:

"Paul by his example pointed out the prize of patient endurance... when he had made his testimony before the rulers, he departed from the world and went into the holy place, having been found as a noble pattern of patient endurance." (1 Clem. 5:5-7) 

Clement does not think that Peter or Paul are nonexistent or unconscious, Peter after his death “went to his appointed place of glory,” and likewise Paul “departed from the world and went into the holy place.” The doctrine of a conscious afterlife was also taught by such early authors as Ignatius of Antioch (I. Rom. 2:2; 3:2; 7:2; 9:2; I. Smyr. 2:1; 3:2; 11:1), Polycarp (P. Phil. 9:2), Hermas (Poimen 15.92.5), Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. 2.34.2), Clement of Alexandria (Stromata 4.3), and Origen. (De Princ. 2.11.5) Which is to say that it was commonplace from the earliest years of the Church to believe in a conscious afterlife—it was not a later development. There are many expressions in the New Testament which describe conscious life in heaven for the righteous who have died. Saint Paul says that the Old Testament saints were awaiting “the city which has foundations, whose architect and builder is God.” (Heb. 11:10) What is this city? The city spoken of is heaven itself, Heb. 11:16 goes on to say, “they desire a better country, that is, a heavenly one. Therefore God is not ashamed to be called their God; for He has prepared a city for them.” (Heb. 11:16) It is beyond doubt that this city is heaven itself. Saint Paul describes the heavenly city further in Heb. 12:22, 23:

“But you have come to Mount Zion and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to myriads of angels, to the general assembly and church of the firstborn who are enrolled in heaven, and to God, the Judge of all, and to the spirits of the righteous made perfect.” 

 

This is a description of the intermediate state, because those in the heavenly city “have not yet received the promises.” (Heb. 11:9) Many of the covenant promises of God require an actual bodily resurrection. Therefore, heaven is not the final destination, it is a temporary resting place for “the spirits of the righteous made perfect.” (Heb. 12:23) This concept was explained by Christ himself, who told his apostles that they would be in heaven only temporarily, at John 14:2 he says:  

“In the house of my Father are many dwelling places (μοναὶ). Otherwise, I would have told you, for I am going my way to prepare a place for you.” (Joh. 14:2)  

When he speaks of dwelling places, he uses the Greek term μοναὶ, which does not mean a permanent residence, but a temporary resting place. This term signifies the temporary tents or tabernacles which were constructed by travelers for brief periods of relaxation during their travels. The Lord Jesus spoke of a time when the tombs will be opened up and the dead will all be raised to life, this is the final state. (Joh. 5:28-29) The hope of a temporary heaven and a permanent resurrected state are expressed alongside one another at Phil. 3:20-21:

“Our citizenship is in heaven, from which also we eagerly wait for a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ; who will transform the body of our humble state into conformity with the body of His glory.” 

It is a common ancient idiom to speak of the dead as sleeping because the corpses of dead persons appear to have fallen asleep. This idiom carried over to the Biblical authors who often speak of death as “sleep.”17 This is seen plainly with the death of Lazarus, Joh. 11:11-13:

“He said to them, “Our friend Lazarus has fallen asleep (κεκοίμηται); but I go, so that I may awaken him.” The disciples then said to Him, “Lord, if he has fallen asleep (κεκοίμηται), he will recover.” Now Jesus had spoken of his death, but they thought that he spoke of taking rest in sleep (κοιμήσεως).” 

Lazarus appears again in a parable about the afterlife found in Luke 16:22-31. This is the same figure mentioned by John, for a discussion of this see Keith L. Yoder, One and the Same? Lazarus in Luke and John (Novum Testamentum Vol. 64. 2022).

These sorts of texts have been seized upon by some physicalists as evidence that the Bible teaches the dead are unconscious or cease to exist entirely. (Acts 13:36; 1 Cor. 11:30; 15:51; Eph. 5:13; 1Thess. 4:14; 5:10)But his language of sleeping in death itself implies a continuation of existence for the mind is not totally inactive in sleep but often dreams. To say that someone is asleep implies that he still exists. Corpses appear to be at rest, and those who die natural deaths tend to have relaxed sleeplike facial expressions. Both ancient Christian and pagan authors who believed in an afterlife referred to the dead as sleeping. The second century work, the Shepherd of Hermas says:

“The apostles and the teachers who preached the name of the Son of God, after they had fallen asleep in the power and faith of the Son of God, preached to those who fell asleep before them.” (Shepherd 15.92.5) 

The author says that the apostles sleep in death and yet also says that they “preached to those who fell asleep before them.” Echoing 1 Peter. 4:6 which says that Christ preached “to those who are dead.” Equivalently, to claim that the Biblical authors did not believe in a conscious afterlife because they spoke of death as “sleep” would be entirely misguided. When the body sleeps the mind is active and often dreaming. The physical body is at rest but the mind keeps working. This phenomenon is a perfect analogy for death when the physical body ceases to function and begins to decay, but the soul and mental life of the deceased continues on. 

Ancient Greek authors who believed firmly that the dead were conscious, often referred to death as sleep because it was a common euphemism. In the Iliad, Homer speaks of the death of Iphidamas and says, ως ο μεν αύθι πεσών κοιμήσατο χάλκεον ύπνον, “So there he fell, and slept a sleep of bronze.” (Iliad 11.241)Sophocles spoke of the death of the legendary king Myrtilus, drowned to death in the ocean and said, εύτε γαρ ο ποντισθείς Μυρτίλος εκοιμάθη, “Myrtilus sank to sleep beneath the waves.”  (Electra 509)  The Roman playwright Plautus, says that the god Mercury threatened death with the words, quid si ego illum tractim tangam ut dormiat, “What if I were to touch him, striking him down, so that he may go to sleep?” (Amphitryon 1.1.157) Such examples suffice to show that the Biblical verses, which like in death to sleep, do not prove the doctrine of soul sleep was accepted by every author. This language was used often by ancient authors who believed in a conscious afterlife. The Biblical term for soul, ψυχή, has many different meanings depending upon the context in question. At times soul simply means life, whether human or animal, thus we read of soldiers "fleeing for their soul,” έφυγον προς την ψυχήν εαυτών. (2 Kngs. 7:7, LXX) 

The story of Noah is summarized this way, “eight souls were brought safely through the water,” οκτώ ψυχαί, διεσώθησαν δι᾽ ύδατος. (1 Pet. 3:20) For this reason Genesis 2:7 says that when Adam was created he became a living soul, that is, a living creature. But the term “soul” is also used to denote the conscious and immaterial part of man which survives the death of the body, as when Christ says, “fear not him who can kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.” (Matt. 10:28) This statement proves that the soul is more durable than the body. Men can kill the bodies of other men but only God can kill the soul. The death of Rachel is described this way in Gen. 35:18, “It came about that her soul was departing, for she had died.” And again the last words of Saint Stephen, “Lord Jesus, receive my spirit,” κύριε Ιησού, δέξαι το πνεύμά μου. (Acts 7:59) What survives the death of the body is at times called soul and in other places called spirit. In other words, the Biblical terms for soul and spirit, ψυχή και πνεύμα, are sometimes used interchangeably, therefore we need not make sharp distinctions between the two either. Saint Paul says that man is composed of body (σώμα), soul (ψυχή) and spirit (πνεύμα). (1Thess. 5:23; Heb. 4:12) In this instance the rational soul is distinguished from the mental inclinations or spirit. At other times spirit signifies that which survives the death of the body, as in Acts 7:59 and elsewhere “soul” denotes that which survives bodily death as in Gen. 35:18; Psa. 16:10; 49:15 et al.

We read many times in the New Testament that Christ will judge “the living and the dead.” (Acts 10:42; 2 Tim. 4:1, 8; Heb. 9:27; 1 Pet. 4:5) It is more than a little strange to say that Christ will “judge the dead” if the dead have ceased to exist. And again, Paul says “at the name of Jesus every knee will bow, of those who are in heaven and on earth and under the earth.” (Phil. 2:10) Those who have died are in mind when he speaks of those who are “under the Earth.” It would be impossible for the dead to offer any sort of voluntary submission to Christ, bowing the knee so to speak, if they are unconscious. (cf. Rev. 5:13) On what basis are the dead to be judged? In 1 Peter 4:5, 6 we read:

“They will give an account to Him who is ready to judge the living and the dead. For the gospel has for this purpose been preached even to those who are dead, that though they are judged in the flesh as people, they may live in the spirit according to the will of God.” 

Peter does not mean those who are figuratively dead because he distinguishes between “the living and the dead,” those who are dead in the flesh but alive in the spirit. On what basis are both the living and the dead judged? Many people died without ever hearing the gospel message. They can both be judged because the gospel was preached even to those who are dead! This assumes the dead are conscious and are capable of comprehending the gospel. Elsewhere in the same epistle Peter describes Christ himself as preaching to the dead:

“For Christ also suffered for sins once for all time, the just for the unjust, so that He might bring us to God, having been put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit; in which He also went and preached to the spirits in prison.” (1 Peter 3:18, 19) 

This is totally incompatible with the view that the dead are unconscious. They would have to maintain that the dead being spoken of are those who are figuratively dead but Peter is talking about people who have actually died. The phrase "the living and the dead” always refers to those who are literally alive and literally dead everywhere else in the bible and to speak of preaching to figuratively dead people would be totally irrelevant to the argument. Peter is explaining why those in their graves can be judged and held accountable in the future judgment. They can be judged because even in death the Gospel was preached to them. Often in the book of Revelation the dead are depicted as conscious before the resurrection takes place. (Rev. 6:8-10; 7:15; 14:1-3, 13; 18:20, 19:1-10) There are many other texts from the Bible which might be cited but these suffice to illustrate that substance dualism has good support in Christian tradition and Scripture.  

Olivet Discourse and Apocalypticism

Matthew 24:1-51; Mark 13:1-37 and Luke 21:5-36.

The Olivet Discourse is found in all of the synoptics and is prominently absent in St. John's gospel. The main goal of believing exegetes, in general, seems to be, to avoid the implication that Jesus is an apocalyptic prophet who foretold an imminent end of the present world in this sermon. The statements, "this generation will not pass away until all these things take place," (Mark 13:30) and the close connection between the "end of the age" and the fall of the temple (Mark 13:1-4; Matt. 24:1-4) suggest a first century fulfillment of his words was intended. Yet the Son of Man has still not returned on a cloud with power and glory to judge the world. (Lk. 21:27, et al) The longest version of the sermon is Matthew's version, so I discuss it most directly. 

It seems to me that in all of the gospels, the apostles did not yet recognize the necessity of the Second Coming, nor the death of the Messiah until after the resurrection of Christ. They still imagined that Christ would walk into Jerusalem as a political leader, tear down the present temple and replace it with the great third temple described by Ezekiel—as they did on other occasions. (cf. Lk. 19:11; Acts 1:6) Their question in Matthew 24:3 represents this misunderstanding, "these things," the destruction of the temple in 70 CE, is quite different from the “parousia and the end of the age” but they did not recognize this yet. 

The first section of the sermon in Matt. 24:4-35, concerns “these things,” the events which befell Jerusalem and the temple in 70 CE. “Truly I say to you, this generation will not pass away until all these things take place. Heaven and earth will pass away, but My words will not pass away.” (Matt. 24:34, 35) I take “these things” mentioned in Matt. 24:3, 34 to be the destruction of the temple but not the Second Coming and Resurrection. It is possible to predict when "these things" will occur, just as easily as one may predict "when summer is near" or when a fig tree will give ripe fruit. (Matt. 24:32) 

I see a change of subject in Matt. 24:36 "But about that day," that is, the Second Coming, "no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but the Father alone.” Instead of talking of a predictable event which will come in that very generation as he did before, Christ now speaks of a particular great “day” which nobody knows except the Father. "You do not know which day your Lord is coming." (Matt. 24:42) “The Son of Man is coming at an hour when you do not think He will.” (Matt. 24:44) In other words, mortal men can have some general and common sense understanding of the timing "these things," just as we would about when a fig tree will become fruitful. But the timing of "that day" is mysterious, and unknown to all except the Father. The subsequent parables at the end of the Olivet Discourse in Matthew chapter 25, I consider to be about the Second Coming and Judgment Day. This seems to be the best way to divide up the sermon to avoid unwelcome eschatological implications. 

However, even in the earlier section of the sermon before the troublesome statement of Verse 34, there are many eschatological predictions. The "great tribulation" (24:21-22), the return of the Son of Man (24:27), the great celestial phenomena predicted by the prophets (24:29) and the rapture of the saints (24:30-31). All of these are to befall the generation being addressed. It is best not to dignify the strange definition games in many Evangelical circles, re-defining γενεά whatever way they please. Further, there are plenty of equally apocalyptic statements throughout the gospel, "But whenever they persecute you in one city, flee to the next; for truly I say to you, you will not finish going through the cities of Israel until the Son of Man comes." (Matt. 10:23) Or the equally troubling promise preceding the transfiguration that the kingdom must arrive in power before the apostles pass away. (Matt. 16:28; Mark 9:1; Lk. 9:27) It seems the approach of Crossan or Mack to deny the historicity of these statements is appealing.