An Excess of Negatives

0. Introduction

Some correspondence theorists such as Armstrong (2004) and Jago (2018) have argued that every truth has a truthmaker; this view is typically called “truthmaker maximalism” (henceforth “TM”). To account for negative propositions (e.g. ‘there are no wizards’) some defenders of TM treat absences or negative states of affairs as spatiotemporal entities. In this paper, I will argue that Barker and Jago’s (2012) model of TM is false because there is no good reason to think that negative states of affairs actually exist.

In the first section, I describe precisely what negative facts are supposed to be, then I defend an argument against their existence and consider objections to my own account of negative facts before a final conclusion.

1. Negative Facts

Negative facts are supposed to be real entities located in space and time in Jago’s version of TM. Maximalists today typically claim: “Every sentence is such that it is true if and only if it has a truthmaker.” (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006, p. 2) To say that every truth has a truthmaker is a strong metaphysical claim because it means there always exists some state of affairs in the world which gives sentences their truth value, contingently or necessarily. In other words, some sentences are true because the meanings they express somehow correspond to states of affairs in the world. Existence seems to be a positive property so is tempting to say all facts are somehow positive, as Russell observed:

“You have a feeling that there are only positive facts, and that negative propositions have somehow or other got to be expressions of positive facts.” (2009, p. 41-42)

But there are negative facts and they must be explained, such as the sentence, “Ern Malley does not exist.” The non-maximalist usually explains negative truths such as these by saying that there are some truths with no truthmakers. The sentence is true because of what does not exist, not because of what does; "the absence of Ern Malley" does not refer to anything with properties but to the lack of the existence of a particular thing. In contrast, the maximalist must say that there exists truthmakers even for negative propositions, “there are specific entities such as the absence of Ern Malley.” (Jago 2018, p. 132) The sentence is true because there exists an entity ‘the absence of Ern Malley’ to which it corresponds. These absences are variously called “negative states of affairs” and “negative facts.” (Jago 2018, p. 132) Jago (2018) admits that the non-maximalist explanation should be preferred if it can account for negative truths because TM does carry many metaphysical obligations. Mumford (2007, p. 48) says that TM seems to treat non-existence as though it were existence, and suggests that treating absences as though they were entities is a misuse of language:

“[C]an it really be a fact that in the world that there is no hippopotamus in the room? This sounds like an absence of a fact, and an absence is nothing at all. Alternatively, could the fact in question be the non-hippopotamus that is in the room?”

Jago and Barker (2012, p. 2) present a model upon which ‘the absence of the hippopotamus in the room would be an entity spatiotemporally located in the room, “we want our negative facts to exist just as much as our positive facts.” This negative fact is supposed to be a fundamental kind of entity, from which properties are abstracted. Negative facts have a kind of non-mereological composition. Jago and Barker (2012, p. 6): 

“As a consequence, we accept negative properties and relations into our ontology, as abstractions from negative facts. If [Fa] — is a negative fact, then λx[Fx]—, the property of non-Fness which is abstracted from it, is a negative one. We then have a corresponding positive fact, [(λx[Fx]−)a]+, the fact that a possesses non-Fness.”

If a is not F and we abstract from this the property of non-Fness, but we must ask whether this is truly a property. Is lacking a property, itself a property? This seems an unnecessary claim. For Jago and Barker (2012, p. 4), absences are also located in time and space—so what about those which are universally true? If there are no fairies, and never will be any fairies, then the entity which is ‘the absence of fairies’ is really omnipresent. It is not located in any particular place, it is at all places and it is true at all times (even timelessly). The fact that there are no fairies would be located in every region there is.

Consider properties like non-Fness again. I would say that this is just the negation of a property, and non-Fness is nothing more than an idea, a way of thinking about our perception of an absence of F. But if it were a property, and nothing possessed Fness, it would then follow that everything has the property of non-Fness. There would be no way to localize non-Fness to any particular space or time.

2. An Argument

Non-Fness is not a property unless lacking a property is itself a property. But the lack of property ought not to be considered a property because this would result in a very bloated ontology. It is also difficult to see what distinguishes one negative property from another aside from appeals to a kind of thisness. The argument might be summarized this way:

1. If absences (or negative states of affairs) are entities, then there are an infinite number of them. (Premise)

2. For there to be an infinite number of absences, they must be distinguished by individuating properties. (Premise)

3. But absences could not have such individuating properties. (Premise)

4. Hence, there are not an infinite number of absences. (From 2 and 3)

5. Hence, absences are not entities. (From 1 and 4)

The truth of the first premise is shown by the fact that there are an infinite number of properties which nothing has. If negative properties exist, TM would commit us to saying that every object has an infinite number of negative properties which are just as existent as their positive properties, e.g. an apple has the negative properties of ‘not-humanness,’ ‘not-numberness,’ ‘not-planetness,’ and so on. An apple would have an infinite number of such negative properties because there are innumerable properties which the apple does not have and will never have.

With regard to the second premise, the sentence “Ern Malley does not exist” would be true according to TM because of an entity which is ‘the absence of Ern Malley.’ But the defining property of this entity is that it is not something. But what other properties does this absence have, other than it is not Ern Malley? Consider also the entity, ‘the absence of fairies’; any other properties it might have are abstracted only from its being an ‘absence of fairies.’ Both absences are universally located and true at all times. Why not say there is a single entity which is both the absence of fairies and the absence of Ern Malley? There must be some individuating properties which distinguish the two entities.

“We’ve presented our theory of facts. However, let’s admit it: our clarification of negative facts is achieved through the notion of anti-instantiation. And what kind of clarification can that be, given that anti-instantiation is opaque? We admit the opacity.” (Jago and Barker, 2012, p. 9)

The third premise states that there are no such individuating properties because there does not seem to be any way to determine whether ‘the absence of Ern Malley’ is a distinct entity from ‘the absence of fairies’; or whether there is actually a single entity which is ‘the absence of Ern Malley and the absence of fairies.’ The defender of TM might make an appeal to a kind of thisness, and argue it is a brute fact that ‘the absence of Ern Malley’ is not ‘the absence of fairies.’ But it is a dubious thing to say that there is nothing that does the metaphysical work of distinguishing these two entities. For TM to be true, there must be an infinite number of such entities which are likewise distinguished by brute facts of identity. At this stage TM becomes more opaque and difficult than any problems it seeks to solve.

In short, I have argued that there does not seem to be any good way to distinguish one negative fact from another and this is especially the case with universal negatives. This problem can be avoided entirely by simply denying the privilege of existence to negative facts.

3. Conceptual Existence and Negative Facts

It is better to regard negative facts as having only a conceptual existence which avoids the costly metaphysical commitments of TM. I shall give my own non-maximalist account of true negative propositions of the sort “Ern Malley does not exist,” and then see if it survives the objections Jago (2018) levies. If it is even possible that my account is true, then it should be preferred because it is simple and does not require postulating an infinite number of entities. In my view, negative facts have only a conceptual existence. When I say “Ern Malley does not exist” I mean only that I have a concept of what it would mean for Ern Malley to exist, but there is no state of affairs in the world which corresponds to this concept. The sentence is true precisely because the opposite sentence “Ern Malley exists” does not have a truthmaker, there is not an entity (e.g. the absence of Ern Malley) that exists which ensures the truth of the sentence because it is not the kind of sentence that would require one. There is no such person as Ern Malley in the furniture of the world, and this is what makes the sentence true.

Jago (2015) responds to this kind of view firstly by saying that it implies that there are three differing types of true propositions, positive (e.g. ‘the sun exists’), negative (e.g. ‘Ern Malley does not exist’) and derivative (either ‘Mark is pacing or Ern Malley does not exist’). I think this threefold distinction is correct. Only the first sort of propositions always require truthmakers. The second sort, as we have seen, do not, and the third sort does if one of the disjuncts is a positive proposition. Jago argues that this categorization fails because of certain true epistemic propositions that do not fall into any of the three categories just spelled out. Hence, the non-maximalist position is implicitly committed to TM or has more fundamental problems, Jago (2015):

“I still think this theory won't work. Here's why: take this proposition—”Max knows there are no daleks.” We've got to work out what kind of proposition that is, according to the non-maximalist lines… it better not be the positive kind; if it is, then it has a truth-maker… Knowledge is factive, so the truth-making must be some entity in the world that guarantees that there are no daleks. And that's just the kind of entity the non-maximalist wanted to avoid—some weirdo absence that somehow guarantees that such and such won't exist.”

So then, the proposition “Max knows there are no daleks” isn’t negative because it involves a claim about what Max knows. It is not positive because it would require a truthmaker ensuring what Max knows. The third option is that the proposition is a derivative proposition. But Jago (2015) objects that this would require a reductive theory of knowledge to which he says, “people have been trying to work out what knowledge is trying to give a reductive definition of knowledge for absolutely honest that hasn't worked out good.” But if a reductive theory of knowledge is at least possible, then this is problematic for TM. The existence of any negative facts or absences is already controversial and is at least as controversial as reductive theories of knowledge, Jago and Barker (2012, p. 1) describe an "enmity to negative facts” among their peers.

Further I would say that modern physics has had much benefit in describing the world in terms of laws and initial conditions, but has had no use for positing negative states of affairs or negative initial conditions. Our scientific theories are useful because they describe reality accurately to some extent. Godfrey-Smith (2003, p. 91-92) gives the example of building a bridge which people will use to cross. If the principles of physics and engineering underlying this project were faulty we ought not to expect success in our project. But physics has been very successful without positing these negative entities. This objection of mine assumes a modest scientific realism, that our theories, to some extent actually describe “what the world is like” and that this issue does not involve metaphysical truths that do not hide beyond the edges of physics. (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p. 347) But this is a reasonable assumption, if something is metaphysically necessary then it should reflect in our physics in some way. In the case of negative facts or absences, Jago and Barker (2012, p. 1) address concerns they are “causally inert" by suggesting that they might be regarded as having causal powers. If absences are really existent entities which have causal powers, then they should be detectable in physics or at least useful to the physicist in her theorizing.

If their existence would make no difference to physics, then I would say that TM is guilty of causal overdetermination. In contrast, it is better to treat positive states of affairs as synonymous to an extent with initial conditions and negative facts as the lack of any such conditions. The non-maximalist explanation fits in well with modern physics. Our physics should inform our metaphysics whenever possible to avoid unfalsifiable theory crafting when we can.

It seems to me that the central problem which might be faced by the non-maximalist solution which I have given is how well it fits with the English language. When we talk about absences or negative facts, it is common to talk about them as though one is referring to entities that exist. But I would say that most people do not believe negative facts are real entities and so even when they use language that seems to imply that they are the sentences or unintended to express that proposition. Negative facts should be regarded as statements about properties that nothing has or things that do not exist in the world. Such statements could only be false if those things or properties actually did exist in the world.

4. Conclusion

Non-maximalist explanations are less problematic than TM because they require less ontological commitments. There are also significant challenges to distinguishing one universal negative fact from another on TM, and solving this problem (if possible) would require further costly metaphysical commitments. The primary objection to non-maximalism raised by Jago regarding reductive theories of knowledge, even if true, is less costly than what TM requires.

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Armstrong, D. (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003). Theory and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jago, Mark (2018). What Truth Is. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jago, Mark & Barker, Stephen (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.

Jago, Mark, (Jan 30, 2015). Lecture: “What Truth is” at the University of Edinburgh https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jyOGlrIiWR

Mumford, S. (2007). Negative truth and falsehood. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107(1): 45–71. 

Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (2006). Truthmaker Maximalism Defended. Analysis 66 (3):260–264.

Russell, B. (2009). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Routledge, Oxford.

What is Metaphysics?

Metaphysics is the study of the most basic principles of reality, the ultimate structure of things, or as the ancient Greeks would say “first principles.” The goal of metaphysics is to find out the truth about the basic nature of reality, to determine what kinds of things exist and what things do not exist and how they relate to each other. Generally, the kind of stuff that Aristotle was concerned about when the wrote his Metaphysics. (Thomson, 265)

One way to conceptualize metaphysics is to say that science typically seeks to describe “how” things work, but metaphysics focuses upon “what” kinds of things exist, what it means for them to exist, and the “why” questions concerning these things. (Ney, 31-36).

A primary concern of metaphysicians is what it means for something to “exist” and what kinds of things exist. Ancient metaphysicians often relied upon reason, intuition, trances, dreams, and the study of nature to draw conclusions about how reality is structured. Plotinus practiced divination and an entire section of his Enneads (3.4) is dedicated to Tutelary Spirits.

Nowadays, metaphysicians rely primarily upon the tools of logic and insights gained from scientific discovery to go about their research. In the past century great discoveries have been made by physicists concerning the nature of space, time, causation and the nature of reality at the microscopic scale. These are of great interest to metaphysicians, who are often concerned with the nature of physical things, free will, time, and how they relate with one another.

A great deal of modern metaphysics is about whether anything exists beyond the natural or physical world. Some philosophers think there are abstract objects (such as mathematical objects) in addition to physical things. An abstract object, would be one which exists but is not extended in space, something which has properties but does not have any physical properties like location, weight, or mass. Some philosophers think that the mind is an immaterial substance (substance dualism) or that there is a God of some sort. If real, such things would exist beyond the physical world in some sense.

In metaphysics, claims about reality are supported by arguments because no direct proof is often available. The premises of these arguments are usually supported by claims about possibility, impossibility and necessity (i.e. modality). Claims about the way things could possibly be, how they could not possibly be, and what things must always be the case. Also scientific evidence is sometimes used to support premises and metaphysical arguments or appeals to intuition. Modern philosophers do not usually make appeals to dreams, mystical experiences, or visions (like Socrates, etc.). (Apology, 21b-d, et al) 

A Basic Introduction to Logic

The primary tool of philosophers is logic, essential to construct arguments and analyze concepts. The field of logic is the systematic study of the principle of valid reasoning. If philosophy is going to arrive at the truth of anything, it requires methods to arrive at the truth. There is nothing more fundamental.

An argument in philosophy is a series of statements or claims which are presented in support of a particular conclusion. A premise is a statement in the argument that leads to the conclusion. There are two basic kinds of arguments, deductive arguments and inductive arguments. The most common example of a valid argument is:

1. All men are mortal.

2. Socrates is a man.

C. Socrates is mortal.

This is an example of a deductive argument. Deductive arguments are arguments which are intended to reason from general principles to specific conclusions. In a valid deductive argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. An argument is sound if and only if, it has true premises and a valid form. It is possible for an argument to be valid and yet unsound.

It is impossible for the premises of a deductive argument to be true, yet for the conclusion to be false. If the first two premises of this example argument are true then the conclusion is entailed by logical necessity. If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then it cannot be the case that “Socrates is not mortal.”

This example argument is also a kind of Categorical Syllogism. A syllogism is a formal argument with numbered or otherwise ordered steps and a conclusion. It is called a categorical syllogism because it reasons about categorical claims, i.e. about the category “men.”

Inductive arguments differ in that they argue from specific observations to a more general conclusion. They include probabilistic arguments, and they seek to make probable conclusions about the world from some set of data which seems to favor the conclusion.

1. About 99% of all species that have ever lived on earth are now extinct.

2. Canis familiaris is a species that has lived on Earth.

C. Therefore, the species canis familiaris is extinct.

The conclusion of this inductive argument is factually wrong, canis familiaris refers to dogs, which are quite common nowadays. Hence, this is an unsound argument. But, it is not an invalid argument. Both of the premises are true and yet the conclusion is false. This illustrates that inductive arguments do not lead to certain conclusions. It is possible for all the premises of an inductive argument to be true and yet for the conclusion to be false—this is unlike deductive arguments, where, if the premises are true then the conclusion cannot be false.

Abductive arguments are sometimes set as a third class of argument (some authors include them as a subset of inductive argument). These are inferences to the best explanation. Most of our daily reasoning may be considered abductive. Consider, when someone sits down in their favorite chair it is because they trust that the chair will be stable when they sit in it. Very rarely do people first test the stability of the chair. It is often possible that someone filed down the legs of the chair or otherwise rigged the chair to collapse when anyone attempted to sit in it. But the chair was stable in the past, and the chair looked fine upon cursory glance, so people tend to sit in their chair and often are right in their belief that the chair will be stable when they sit in it. They make an abductive inference that the chair will not collapse once they sit in it. An example of an abductive argument would be:

1. There are cell phones in the world.

2. Humans tend to make cell phones.

C. All cell phones are made by humans.

It is possible that there is a cell phone made by an artificial intelligence, or an alien or by some unknown process. But the best explanation for all the cell phones in the world is that humans have made them. This is the simplest explanation, consistent with what is usually true about cell phones, as stated in premise 2. Many would even think it “crazy” to deny the conclusion of the argument without some strong evidence of non-human cell phone makers. Why is this the “best explanation”? What constitutes a “best explanation?” This depends upon the standards of explanation, justification, and other criteria that the reasoner has in place. But generally, and in our everyday life, explanations are good insofar as they are simpler than rival explanations, explain the data under consideration, and are consistent with our background knowledge.

Symbolic logic is a way of talking about logical expressions and structures without using traditional language. It allows for more precise expressions of logical formulas than vernacular speech. Consider again the following example:

1. All men are mortal.

2. Socrates is a man.

C. Socrates is mortal.

It is possible to symbolize this argument in the following way, if we let M(x) = “x is mortal” and H(x) = “x is a man” and s = “Socrates”

1. ∀x(H(x) ⊃ M(x))

2. H(s)

C. M(s)

The subjects are substituted with variables or letters and operators or adjectival expressions are substituted for symbols. For example, ⊃ means “then” or “entails.” The symbol ∀ means “all” or “for every.” To say “∀x” is then, to make a claim about all x’s i.e. about anything which is an x. The parentheses are used to divide up the expressions and organize them, so we know the full range of applications for the expressions given i.e. it groups things together for us.

What is Philosophy?

The English word philosophy is derived from the Greek φιλοσοφία (filosofia) which means love of wisdom. Webster’s dictionary gives a definition of philosophy which is too broad to apply to the academic study of philosophy, “all learning exclusive of technical precepts and practical arts.”

The Platonic dialogue, the Euthydemus says “philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable and may be used.” In the early days of the scientific era, the now separate fields of chemistry, biology, and physics were together labeled as “natural philosophy” because they sought to gain wisdom about the natural world. Nowadays, we make a distinction between “science” and “philosophy.” Bertrand Russell considered philosophy to be the study of the uncertain, an attempt to gain clarity on those facts which are outside the reach of science. On one occasion, Russell said “science is what we know and philosophy is what we don't know.”

Nowadays, modern philosophers generally like to think that their work leads to knowledge of something and is practically useful. Academic philosophers often wish their work to be practical rather than abstract, and their theories to be natural rather than spiritual. Since Karl Popper, it is especially fashionable for philosophers to desire their work to be beneficial to science. Modern philosophy refers to an academic study of the nature of reality, existence, the mind and knowledge—it is a quest to understand the truth about the most general features of the world. It considers questions like “What is existence?” “Is there a God?” “What is consciousness?” “What is the nature of moral values?”

Introductory Philosophical Resources:

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

Perseus Digital Library (Tufts University)

The Internet Classics Archive (MIT)

Essences, Properties and Apophaticism

0. Introduction

Apophatic theology is perhaps most closely associated with the Eastern Fathers and it is the view that the divine essence is utterly transcendent, ineffable, infinite and incomprehensible. As a consequence, one must use negative speech or apophatic language concerning God, saying what he is not rather than what he is. I shall discuss the distinction between essences and properties that this doctrine implies and I will argue it entails a denial of any sort of essentialism, and makes it impossible to make coherent claims about the essence of any particular. 

1. The Divine Essence

The New Testament authors say that “no one has seen God at any time,” (Joh. 1:18; 6:46; 1 Joh. 4:12) and even declare that it is impossible for him to be seen, “who alone has immortality and dwells in approachable light, whom no man has ever seen or can see.” (1 Tim. 6:16) The epistles of Paul give the title “the invisible God.” (Col. 1:15; 1 Tim. 1:17; cf. Rom. 1:20) Paul describes the transcendence of God this way: 

“O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! “For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?” “Or who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?” For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen.” (Rom. 11:33-36) 

These statements express a great distance between God and the created order, in terms of nature and comprehension. But there are also claims to the opposite effect, that God is close to the world and all of creation, “in him we live, and move, and have our existence.” (Acts 17:28) The saints have a special closeness with the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Paul says to the Corinthians, “The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all.” (2 Cor. 13:14) They are baptized “in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.” (Matt. 28:19) The Johannine writings claim the saints will see God, as he is, and will “be one” with the Father in a similar manner to how Christ is one with the Father. (1 Joh. 3:1-2; Joh. 17:21-24) The eastern fathers often claimed that God’s essence was infinite and transcended all comprehension and is therefore inaccessible to all creatures. As in John of Damascus, “As regards what God is, it is impossible to say what he is in his essence, so it is better to discuss him by abstraction from all things.” (Expos. Fidei 1.4) Dionysius the Areopagite tells us, “He cannot be known by the senses, nor in an image, nor by opinion, nor by reason, nor by knowledge.” (De divinis nominibus 1.5) Dionysius explains that the divine essence is not on our plane of existence or in any way analogous to existing things in our sense-experience, and is forever beyond our reach, “He is neither conceived, nor expressed, nor named. And He is not any of existing things, nor is He known in any one of existing things. And He is all in all, and nothing in none. And He is known to all, from all, and to none from none.” (De div. nom. 7.3.) Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) admitted that when taken together all of these statements appear contradictory, but he claims they are both true. 

“It is right for all theology which wishes to respect piety to affirm sometimes one and sometimes the other, when both affirmations are true.” (Physical and Theological Chapters, 121.) 

Gregory Palamas is most famous for articulating and defending a distinction between the divine essence and the uncreated energies of God which was affirmed by the orthodox Councils of Constantinople of 1341, 1351 and 1368 which are sometimes called the Palamite councils. Palamas says the divine essence “exceeds even His uncreated energies, since this essence transcends all affirmation and all negation." (Triads, 2.3.8) The saints participate in the energies or operations of God, and thereby in the life of God and become deified (theosis) but they do not participate in the essence of God, “Illumination or divine and deifying grace is not the essence but the energy of God.” (Physical and Theological Chapters, 69.) 

2. Apophaticism and Divine Properties

In conciliar formulations of the Trinity doctrine, the three divine persons are the “one God,” hence, the only true God is the Trinity. There are not three Gods because the divine persons are identical with the divine essence, and yet there are three distinct persons because the persons are not identical with one another. Cyril of Alexandria says in the Council of Ephesus (431) the Son “is One with his Father through the identity of essence.” (Cum salvator noster, 12.) The Second Council of Constantinople (553) likewise, "the nature or essence of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is one." The Father is unbegotten, while the Son is begotten, and the Holy Ghost proceeds, therefore, the conciliar definitions claim a real difference exists between the persons. As Gregory of Nyssa says, “the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity.” (Not Three Gods, 18.) 

The divine essence is incomprehensible so must be talked about only in a negative manner, saying what it is not. Even here our language is not perfect, says Dionysius, “when pursuing the negative method to reach That which is beyond all abstraction, we must begin by applying our negations to things which are most remote from It.” (De Theologia Mystica, 3.) The Synodical Tome (1341) of the first Palamite council affirmed “the blessed and holy Godhead in its essence is beyond ineffable and beyond unknowable and infinitely removed from all unlimitedness.” (par. 28.) If the persons of the Trinity are identical with the essence, then it follows that the Trinity is likewise incomprehensible and must be described only “by abstraction” which is to say negatively, or apophatically. Therefore, Augustine says “If we are asked to define the Trinity, we can only say, it is not this or that.” (De Trin. 4.100.1) Evagrius Ponticus similarly says “remember the true faith and know that the Holy Trinity does not make himself known.” (Epistle 29.) And Dionysius again, "The Supernal Triad, Deity above all essence, knowledge and goodness." (De Theologia Mystica, 1.1) However, if someone were to ask for a definition of the Trinity and I were to answer, “the Trinity is not a book nor is it a color.” This would not be an insightful or satisfying answer. It would be an answer only of negation, saying what the Trinity is not. It would also seem to make any systematic theology impossible if God could not be described positively whatsoever. But both Augustine, Dionysius and Evagrius offer many positive descriptions of the Trinity in their writings, saying that there are three persons, and describing their relations and so on. This seems like a contradiction. To say that the divine essence is utterly unknowable, while simultaneously making claims about God, his properties, and how many persons God is. This apparent contradiction is addressed by making a distinction between God’s properties and his essence. 

"It is necessary to distinguish this negative method of abstraction from the positive method of affirmation, in which we deal with the Divine Attributes." (De mystica theologia 2.2) 

For Dionysius, one might know everything about the attributes of God and still know nothing about his essence. Borrowing somewhat from the tools of Aristotelian metaphysics, the eastern made a distinction between the unknowable essence of God and his properties. Aristotle made a distinction between essences and properties or accidents. Though modern interpreters disagree over precisely what Aristotle means by an essence in distinction to a form, the details are somewhat inconsistent, “the substance (ούσια) is the form (μορφή)” of a thing, and yet he also says, “By the substance without matter I mean essence,” λέγω δὲ οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. (Met. 1032b14) Aristotle also discusses four different sorts of causes or explanations, αίτια, a term which the Cappadocians would later borrow to describe trinitarian processions. (Phys. ii. 2; Met.  5.1013a cf. Basil of Caesarea, De Spiritu Sancto 6; Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 2.3; Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. Eun. 1.28.1, et al.) 

Which is to say, in the traditional view, it is possible to make many statements about the properties of God, to assert that he is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent,  necessarily existent, etc. without having said anything about the divine essence itself directly. The essence remains “neither an object of intellectual nor of sensible perception, nor is absolutely anything of things existing,” but God may positively be described as “almighty” and “the Cause formative of all.” (De divinis nominibus, 7.3.) But it is not the view of the eastern fathers that God has no properties.

3. Properties and Essences

For Dionysius, one can only speak negatively about the divine essence but it is possible to make positive affirmations about the properties of God. An illustration of this distinction may be found in the mystery of the eucharist, which asserts that the bread and wine literally become the body and blood of Christ. (cf. Mk. 14:22–24) Early church fathers like Ignatius of Antioch took this literally, condemning the Docetae for denying that "the Eucharist is the flesh of our Savior Jesus Christ." (Smyrnaeans 6:2) And of course, the other fathers aforementioned would not deny ex professio the real presence of Christ in the eucharist. Though the bread and wine retain their original properties, they are believed to transform in essence, becoming Christ's body and blood while still appearing as bread and wine. This view seems to entail a denial of any sort of essentialism, because all of the properties of the bread and wine remain the same although there is a change of essence. Likewise, whatever knowledge one has about the properties of God, it remains impossible to know anything about his essence. The metaphysical claims made by the fathers seem to necessitate the following claims: 

1. For any entity a it has an essence e and instantiates a set of properties.

2. For any a it is the e of a that determines what sort of thing it is, not whatever properties it has. 

3. For any e it is ineffable iff it is impossible for any created intellect (νοὸς) to define or comprehend it.

4. For any e it is transcendent iff it is not spatially circumscribed, and transcends all categories of existence (ὑπεροὐσία).

It seems the most problematic claim is 2, but this claim is necessary for the sort of distinction that must be made for apophaticism to be sensible. As in the case of the eucharist, the flesh of Christ can have all of the properties of bread and yet still not be bread. The eucharistic offering is the flesh of Christ because that is its essence, even if it has none of the properties which are associated with flesh rather than bread. If situations like this can occur then the properties a thing has do not give us insights into what their essences could be. The essences of any particular object remain epistemically inaccessible to us. The only reason anybody thinks that bread becomes flesh in the eucharistic ceremony is that they believe God has revealed that this takes place, but in the absence of a divine revelation there would not be any method to tell that the bread has become flesh. There are no set of scientific experiments that would be possible, because the physical properties of the sacramental bread do not change after the consecration. There just is no way to know what essence anything would have in the absence of a divine revelation. It might be that my chair really has the essence of Julius Caesar, even though it has all of the properties of being a chair and I could never be made privy to this fact. What is an essence supposed to be if not the essential properties that a thing has? It seems that “essence” is a meaningless word if it is divorced from the properties of a thing in the way these mystics wish to. If it is not the case that the essence of a thing determines what it is irrespective of what properties it has, then apophatic theologians are simply contradicting themselves when making claims about divine properties while simultaneously saying that the divine essence is indefinable and unknowable. If their claims about his properties are in fact true, then they are defining the divine essence to some extent when talking about God’s properties—unless a strict separation is made between essences and properties in the way in which I have spelled out. 

Origins of Divine Ineffability

0. Introduction

To varying degrees, Jewish and Christian theologians have traditionally affirmed the doctrine that God is ineffable, which is to say, that God is beyond our rational comprehension to some extent. Maimonides begins his definition of divine ineffability by saying, "We are only able to apprehend the fact that He is and cannot apprehend his quiddity." (Guide to the Perplexed, 1190b) One practical definition of ineffability is to say that some entity a is ineffable iff it is impossible for any intellect to comprehend what sort of thing it is or to define it. Here, I talk about the doctrine and how it develops in the eastern patristic tradition somewhat. 

1. Biblical Opinions

In the book of Exodus (33:20), God says to the prophet Moses “you cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live.  These words are taken in the plain sense by the author of the J source, God has a corporeal form and Moses is permitted to see the back of God but not his face. God tells Moses that he shall stand upon a rock, “and I will cover you with my hand until I have passed by; then I will take away my hand, and you shall see my back but my face shall not be seen.” (Exodus 33:21-23) These words are fulfilled literally in the story that follows, Moses stands upon the rock and God descends from heaven—his back is seen but his face is not. (Exodus 33:20–34:35) Elsewhere in the J material, God is as an embodied being who occasionally descends to earth, even eating meals on occasion, and who dwelled in the tabernacle with Israel in the wilderness. (Genesis 3:8; 11:5; 18:8; Exodus 17:1; 25:9-11) But this vision of God as an embodied being who occasionally descends to earth especially when evoked by Moses) is not shared by all of the Pentateuchal authors. 

“As noted, in J, Yahweh accompanies the Israelites, in the form of the pillar of cloud (by day) and fire (by night) introduced already in Exodus 13:21–22 and mentioned again in Exodus 14:19–20, 24 and Numbers 14:14. In P, the divine presence dwells in the Tabernacle at all times, as indicated by the cloud that sits in the Tent of Meeting. In E, however, the cloud that signifies the presence of the deity is not constantly present as in J and P; it appears only when Moses goes into the Tent of Meeting to communicate with Yahweh (Exod 33:9–10). It is thus a distinctive feature of E’s historical presentation that Yahweh is not present among the people but appears only when called upon by Moses.” [Joel S. Baden, The Composition of the Pentateuch: Renewing the Documentary Hypothesis. Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2012, p. 98.] 

The views of the New Testament authors are more sophisticated, rather than an embodied God whose face is too glorious to be seen, the Johannine works teach that “God is a spirit.” (Joh. 4:24) Because God is a spirit, the Evangelist presents Jesus of Nazareth as saying it matters not whether men worship him at Mount Sinai or Mount Gerizim, or any other place. (Joh. 4:19-24; cf. De Principiis, 1.1.4.) In other words, God is not physical, so any place is as good as another to worship him. A radical departure from the Old Testament passages which claim that he must be worshiped in Zion, because “this is my resting place forever; here I will dwell, for I have desired it.” (Psa. 132:13-14; Deut. 12:5-6; 1 Sam. 8:29-30; 2 Chron. 7:12, 16) [The Samaritan Pentateuch replaces Zion and Sinai with Gerizim in the relevant places.] While the Pentateuch says only that the face of God may not be seen, there are more absolute statements in the New Testament, where it is denied that God has been seen at all. The gospel of John (1:18) says “No one has seen God at any time; the only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, He has explained Him,”  And again, “Not that anyone has seen the Father except he who is from God; he has seen the Father." (Joh. 6:46) The first epistle of John (4:12) likewise, “No one has ever seen God.” But in the same epistle it is claimed, “we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.” (1 Joh. 3:2) Likewise, the third epistle of John (1:11) claims that “the one who does evil has not seen God.” Hence, even within the same epistle God is depicted as unseen and yet one who will be seen by the blessed in heaven. The pastoral epistles not only say that he is “invisible” but that “no one has ever seen or can see him.” (1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16) Paul gives him the title “the invisible God.” (Col. 1:15; cf. Rom. 1:20; Heb. 11:27) But in the gospel of Matthew (18:10) we find the saying “angels always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven.” From these passages there is depicted a God who is both seen and unseen, familiar and yet distant. 

2. The Eastern Fathers

The Eastern Fathers sought to explain how it is true that “no one has ever seen God” and yet that the saints “shall see him as he is” in the blessedness of the beatific vision. (1 Joh. 3:2; 4:12) They claimed that the divine essence is utterly ineffable, incomprehensible and unknowable by any created intellect. The founder of the Alexandrian school, Origen, taught that it is absurd to “think of God as in any degree corporeal [or embodied], we go on to say that, according to strict truth, God is incomprehensible and incapable of being measured.” (De Principiis 1.1.5.)  Dionysius the Areopagite tells us, “He cannot be known by the senses, nor in an image, nor by opinion, nor by reason, nor by knowledge.” (De divinis nominibus 1.5) As in John of Damascus, “As regards what God is, it is impossible to say what he is in his essence, so it is better to discuss him by abstraction from all things.” (Expos. Fidei 1.4) The divine essence is transcendent and must be discussed by “abstraction” as John explains, which is to say, negatively. When Scripture says “God is light,” (1 Joh. 1:5) the meaning is explained this way, “He is not light but above light: and when we speak of Him as light, we mean that He is not darkness.” (Expos. Fidei 1.4) Elsewhere, using semi-paradoxical language he describes the divine essence as super-essential or beyond existence, ὑπεροὐσία, “because he transcends all existing things, even existence itself.” (Ibid.) As Dionysius also says, “He is neither conceived, nor expressed, nor named. And He is not any of existing things, nor is He known in any one of existing things. And He is all in all, and nothing in none. And He is known to all, from all, and to none from none.” (De divinis nominibus, 7.3.) 

Undoubtedly inspired by Plotinus who says of the absolute One, that it is “beyond being,” ὑπερόντως and transcended the intellect. (Ennead 6.8.14) For Plotinus it is impossible entirely to comprehend the absolute One with the intellect, “Mind [νοὸς] enhances the divine quality of the Soul [ψυχή], as father and as immanent presence; nothing separates them but the fact that they are not one and the same, that there is succession… What the Mind must be is carried in the single word that Soul, itself so great, is still inferior." (Ennead 5.3.3) Mind must be inferior to the One because it is compounded for it contains a multiplicity of Ideas and the One is free of composition, “Mind stands as the image of the One.” (Ennead 5.1.7.) As Clark explained, 

“These Ideas, however, this Divine Mind, is still not the highest principle of all. For in this realm duality remains. Since the Ideas are distinct from each other, there is multiplicity. In knowledge there is always a subject and a predicate, a knower and an object known, and hence duality. But duality is secondary to unity. Therefore it still remains to climb the steep ascent of heaven to the source, the One.” [Gordon Clark, Hellenistic Philosophy. Appleton-Century-Crofts: New York, 1940, pp. 229, 230.]

For the Neo-Platonist, composition implies contingency, and imperfection, because the One is the Good and the Beautiful, the first principle. (Ennead 5.1.1.) Clement of Alexandria seeks to go further than Plotinus, and says God is “above unity and surpasses the One,” δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα. (Paidagogos, 1.8.) As Clement says elsewhere, “God is not in darkness or in place, but above both space and time, and qualities and objects. Wherefore, neither is he at any time in a part, either as containing or contained, either by limitation or by sections.” (Stromata 2.2) God may be known by direct experience through participation in his energies but his essence remains foreign to us. This is a participation in the life of God, not an intellectual affirmation of some set of propositions, Basil of Caesarea explained, 

“The operations are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we know our God from His operations, but do not undertake to approach near to his essence. His operations come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our reach.” (Epistle 234)

The incomprehensibility of the divine essence would mean that it is absurd to try and comprehend the essence of God by the intellect, therefore, Gregory Nazianzen says “reasoning counts for little in knowledge of God,” οί μέν λογισμοί μικρόν είς γνώσιν θεού. (Carmina Moralia, 37.) Because no created intellect can comprehend the divine essence, those passages which ascribe a unique knowledge of God to Christ were used as evidence of the deity of Christ. John Chrysostom says, 

“As then many have seen Him in the mode of vision permitted to them, but no one has beheld His Essence, so many of us know God, but what His substance can be none knows, save only He that was begotten of Him. For by knowledge He here means an exact idea and comprehension, such as the Father has of the Son. For he says, “As the Father knows me, even so know I the Father” [John 10:15] and in another place, “Not that any man has seen the Father, save He which is of God.” [John 6:46] Wherefore, as I said, the Evangelist mentions the bosom, to show all this to us by that one word; that great is the affinity and nearness of the Essence, that the knowledge is nowise different, that the power is equal. For the Father would not have in His bosom one of another essence, nor would He have dared, had He been one among many servants, to live in the bosom of his Lord, for this belongs only to a true Son, to one who has much confidence towards His Father, and who is in nothing inferior to Him.” (Homiliae in Evangelium Ioannis, 15.2) 

To any created intellect the divine essence is totally invisible, and unknowable, even to the holy angels Chrysostom says “to them His essence is invisible.” (Ibid.) Christ says in John 5:37 “And And the Father who sent me has himself borne witness to me. His voice you have never heard, his form (είδος) you have never seen.” Of this passage Theophilus of Antioch says, “His form (είδος) is unspeakable, expressible, since it is invisible to human eyes.” (Ad Autolychum 1.1-17) Likewise, John of Damascus says after quoting John 1:18, 

“The Deity, therefore, is ineffable and incomprehensible. For no one knows the Father, save the Son, nor the Son, save the Father.” [Matthew 11:27] And the Holy Spirit, too, “so knows the things of God as the spirit of the man knows the things that are in him.” [1 Corinthians 2:11] Moreover, after the first and blessed nature no one, not of men only, but even of supramundane powers, and the Cherubim, I say, and Seraphim themselves, has ever known God, save he to whom He revealed Himself.” (Expos. Fidei 1.1) 

The appearances of God in the Old Testament were harmonized as visions of the pre-incarnate Christ temporarily taking a visible form, or as appearances of angelic beings, Chrysostom again says. 

“It is to declare that all these were instances of (His) condescension, not the vision of the Essence itself unveiled… He prepared them from old time to behold the substance of God, as far as it was possible for them to see It; but what God really is, not only have not the prophets seen, but not even angels nor archangels. If you ask them, you shall not hear them answering anything concerning His Essence.” (Homily 15.1)

Therefore, on the traditional eastern model, the persons of the Trinity have full knowledge of the essence, because the Trinity knows himself. But for the created intellect, it is impossible for God’s essence to be known directly, His properties may be known but his essence may not, hence knowledge of God can be obtained indirectly by two general methods. 

1. By contemplation of the λόγοι of the creation which manifests him. 

2. By direct experience of his uncreated energies (ενεργεία) which means to participate in the life (ζωή και βίος) of God. 

The distinction between the essence of God and his properties, commonly called the Essence and Energies Distinction (EED) became a standard feature of Eastern Orthodoxy after the Palamite Controversy. These ideas were given formal exposition in the Councils of Constantinople of 1342, 1351, and 1368. But if I were to talk about the syntheses of Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas directly, this would become a very lengthy discussion indeed.